Considering the Military Option

What motivates humanitarian interventionists?

All Americans have been affected by the TV footage of death camps and tortures, rape victims and orphans. In sorting through the world's quarrels, it seems that the troops follow the television cameras. This adds up to humanitarianism of the best sort (sympathy with victims) making foreign policy of the worst sort (ill-defined military missions against villains).

Part of the problem with this motivation is that it logically leads America to intervene in myriad other human nightmares, from the jungles of Cambodia to the deserts of southern Sudan. Yet prioritizing victims often leads to the conclusion that Western lives are more precious than blacker or browner ones.

"Safe Havens"

This strategy provides no clear exit and could trap peacekeepers into a decades-long commitment, much like Cyprus, where UNPROFOR has been separating combatants for 20 years. And, to insure safety within the havens, Serb troops and artillery would have to be pushed back at least 10 miles from the borders of the havens. The U.N. estimates a brigade would be needed to protect Sarajevo, and a battalion would be needed for each of the other six enclaves.

Air Strikes

A salient truth of using tactical airpower against artillery is to clear the way for armor and infantry. With nothing to follow air strikes, the artillery positions will be immediately re-established.

Demonstrative air strikes will not discourage but will galvanize the Serbs. Bombing is usually deemed by those who do it as a way to break enemy morale and, by the enemy, to build it. "Air strikes would only prove that air strikes don't have much impact," said Gen. MacKenzie, former U.N. commander in Bosnia. Further, he warned, Serbian forces would overrun the lightly armed U.N. soldiers within 12 hours of any bombardment (UNPROFOR has had 39 KIA and 414 WIA in only 13 months).

Another problem with humanitarian-inspired military intervention is that violence often begets more violence - including on our TV screens.

At the sight of flattened Serbian villages, the first American reaction will be to blame our Air Force for imprecise bombing (remember the schools & mosques in Iraq?); the second to blame ourselves for escalating the violence.

"When the bombing starts, and those now chanting for military involvement see the enormous collateral damage against civilians and the scant impact on the artillery, there will be an immediate abandonment of support for the [effort]" said Rep. Robert Torricelli.

The first photos of American aid workers held hostage by Serbs are likely to weaken American resolve. "Doing the right thing" in such situations involves violence. And few humanitarian interventionists have the stomach for it.

Rearming the Muslims

The primary weapons the Muslims need are antitank weapons, artillery and even tanks, said the Bosnian commander of Turbe. Some supplies could be airdropped, but heavy shipments would require overland transport. That means the Croats would have to cooperate. (They have seized half the weapons smuggled to the Muslims.)

U.S. Ground Forces

Civilian leaders without military experience are forever mistaking their soldiers for police. A modern army that does not move is bound to fail - it is a machine that has been constructed for maneuver and nothing else. Keeping it
still is the surest way to kill it.

Even if no major U.S. units were committed to Bosnia, some combat troops would be required since the Muslims would need to be trained on the new weaponry and it is Special Forces mission to do so. (This would create a FID/UW CA mission). Gen. MacKenzie warned that, "As soon as American troops arrived... it would be in the best interest of the Muslims to take on the Americans and make it look like someone else was doing it."

Sen. Nunn said that if Clinton wants to use military force he would first need to get congressional approval.

Yet, Clinton has ruled out ground forces for uses other than peacekeeping, but he hasn't said what he would do if the air strikes fail.

Gen. Powell has doubts about Clinton's strategy: He told Congress any military action should be massive or not at all. Further, he told Clinton that he couldn't guarantee military success in Bosnia, whereas he told Bush that Iraq was "a lock."

Russia

Yeltsin has signed on to the U.N. plan, and even agreed to provide additional troops for a peacekeeping effort. However, another coup by Russian hardliners cannot be discounted. Were it to occur, two or three Russian airborne divisions and several regiments of aircraft could easily arrive overnight in Belgrade.

Conclusion

Given the higher stakes, the allies are unlikely to sign on until Clinton starts using pressure, rather than consultation, as his approach. "If we don't tell the allies what we want to happen, in no uncertain terms, they'll never decide."

The U.S. has to know precisely what it wants to achieve in Bosnia - not just, vaguely, an end to the horror. Without a clear military objective, and a principle strong enough to hazard lives for, the U.S. cannot hope to lead by hassling.

Kosovo may try to reconvene its independent parliament that the Serbs broke up last winter. Serbia moved a Bn+ into Kosovo, and is arming Serb civilians there. Border clashes are occurring more frequently along the Kosovo-Albania border.

Serb radicals in Vojvodina are agitating for violence against indigenous Hungars.

3 May 93

Croatia regards a second war with Serbia as inevitable if peace efforts fail. Serbian forces has been practicing amphibious maneuvers near Vukovar and Krajina. Croatia has been rearming for several months.

The Serbian economy is close to collapse. A dollar is worth 60,000 dinars. Unemployment is 50%. Trade in anything but foodstuffs is at a standstill.

Milosevic is confident he would get more Russian support - probably in the form of weapons, oil and transport (Yeltsin could have serious problems in Russia if he endorsed military action against fellow Slavs). As it is, Serbia has been receiving oil from Greece and Romania. "You will be able to buy a Romanian or Bulgarian customs agent on April 26," said a diplomat in Belgrade, "but the price will go up."

There are almost 30,000 cases of infectious disease (including dysentery and viral hepatitis) in Bosnia.

4 May 93

In the wake of last month's train kidnapping, Montenegro is considering secession from the FRY.
Iran sent $20 million to the Bosnian Muslims, Turkey loaned $100 million to Croatia, and Iraq is trading FRY oil for tanks and artillery.

Things may be heating up in previously peaceful Slovenia: it has been at odds with Italy and Croatia over the Bay of Pirin and the city of Sveta Gora, and it just activated a new division.

Nota: Janez Jansa, the Slovene Defense Minister, makes alot of news, but other Slovene politicians are barely mentioned. That makes it seem as if Jansa is the main mover in Slovenia (which is ostensibly a democracy).

6 May 93

The U.S. House passed a $1.2 billion supplemental military spending bill. $100 million is for enforcing the Iraqi no-fly zone. None was for Bosnia (one U.S. division would cost another $1 billion to $1.5 billion for six months).

The average Serb needs facts. Few Serbs are aware of what is going on in Bosnia. The extremely nationalist Serb Radical Party (led by Seselj) has seized control of FRY broadcasting. A siege mentality has set in; even civilized people are crediting the propaganda. The U.S. could counter this at minuscule cost with telecommunications (like a Serbo-Croatian channel on Radio Free Europe).

38 generals were ousted from the FRY military, including two moderates (the intel chief & the deputy commander of armed forces). The shakeup started in the intel services, and is seen as a consolidation of Milosevic's power.

Bosnian Serbs are excising Turkish (i.e., Muslim) influence from words and place names under their control.

The Bosnian Serb parliament rejected the U.N. peace plan, but in an interesting move deferred it's approval to a vote of the people on 5/16. Clinton dismissed the deferral as "a delaying tactic."

Serbia supposedly cut off all but humanitarian supplies to the Bosnian Serbs.

7 May 93

U.S. allies want to postpone a decision on further action until: 1) the 5/15 Bosnian Serb referendum on the peace plan, 2) they see if Serbia's promise to withhold supplies from the RS has an effect, and 3) the Serb-Muslim cease-fire holds. If the cease-fire holds, they will be reluctant to endorse military action.

The U.N. embargo has choked off goods for small FRY businesses (resulting in numerous bankruptcies). But the embargo will do little good unless it is also applied to Croatia (the Serbs are talking to the Croats about a division of spoils).

Nota: As of 5/11 the FRY-RS border still had not been sealed. Serb civilians may actually be economically better off in the RS, than in FRY. The border has at least 120 crossing points over a 330-mile length.

Iraq, a potential Serbally, was reported over the weekend to have made an attempt on Bush's life when he visited Kuwait last month.

Nota: This seems to be solely an Iraqi effort, since Bush is no longer in a position to influence the outcome in Yugoslavia.

Croat-Muslim fighting is intensifying around Mostar, Jablanica and Konjic. The three cities lie on a strategic road that runs north and bends east toward Sarajevo. Jablanica is important because it is a key crossroads and is near a major dam, but Mostar has seen the heaviest fighting. Some Croat attacks were supposedly supported by Serb artillery.

A trade commission, headed by the Albanian president, held talks with Croatia's president.

11 May 93

Ethnic Albanians are threatening to break away from Macedonia.

The White House also weighed sending American "peacekeepers" to Macedonia.

Nota: This area could be
on the Croats if they continue to attack Muslims; 3) Place U.S. peacekeepers in Kosovo, in addition to those that would be placed in neighboring Macedonia.

The European "safe area" proposal is not favored because the currently designated "safe areas" are not.

Note: The lack of U.S. action since the Bosnian Serb's resounding rejection of the U.N. plan can only strengthen the Bosnian Serb's belief that they made the right decision, that the U.S. and its allies will not take action. Why would they think that? Because of statements like the following, uttered by a U.S. official, "There's no point in having a meeting until we all agree."

9 May 93
The U.S. Secretary of State ruled out U.S. action without allied support.

22 May 93
Suleyman Demirel, a former prime minister, was elected president of Turkey to succeed the late Turgut Ozal.

24 May 93
Bosnian president Izetbegovic condemned the plan to create "safe havens" for the Muslims. The creation of the havens would be a de facto elimination of Bosnia as a state, plus havens would make them fixed targets.

25 May 93
The U.N. approved a war crimes tribunal for atrocities in the Balkans.

27 May 93
A week ago the RS told its army to cease operations and abide by a cease-fire.

Note: Obviously this has not happened. This may be a RS plan to dodge responsibility for continued violence by claiming that groups they "can't control" (like guerrillas) doing it.

1 Jun. 93
FRY president Cosic was sacked by Milosevic.

2 Jun. 93
Riots erupted in Belgrade over the ouster of Cosic and worsening economic conditions:
70% of the FRY budget is again slotted for the military; industrial production is down 2/3's since 1989; 90% of their tax returns have irregularities; 42% of the economy is in the "gray" market; there's a $2 billion loss in food exports due to the embargo; rationing is being implemented; and there's been triple-digit inflation every month this year. The FRY government predicts economic collapse in 6-12 months.

Quote
"UNPROFOR is the sort of institution that transforms a temporarily adverse situation into a permanently adverse situation." (Alija Isakovic, Sarajevo journalist)

Sources