

YUGO NEWS



10 Sept 93

Soldiers of the largest unit in the Bosnian Serb army **mutinied** and took over Banja Luka. They are protesting war profiteering - front-line soldiers are paid \$2/week, while some Serbs have made fortunes despite the embargo - and demanding the resignation of Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic.

† * C

Italy has deployed additional troops along the Slovene border to prevent the infiltration of terrorists from the Balkans.

Note: Last month Karadzic threatened terrorist attacks against Austria and Germany if NATO intervened in Bosnia.

13 Sept 93

NATO plans to send 50,000 "peacekeepers" to Bosnia, with up to half coming from the U.S. Our participation would be dependent on **congressional approval**. NATO would only deploy after the three warring sides made peace. Clinton added the proviso that Bosnian agreement would have to be "free."

† * C

Meanwhile, fierce **fighting erupted** around the Croatian capitol of **Zagreb**. The Serb attacks were in retaliation for Croat seizure of three Serb towns in the disputed Krajina region. Overt Serb-Croat hostilities had lain dormant for most of 1993. (See the 18 July 93 item in the August edition of Yugo News).

† * C

Also, the Croats continued to battle Muslims in **Mostar**. Over the past two months, the Muslims have successfully expanded their territory in central Bosnia, driving Croats from key towns and firming up supply lines. But the Muslim effort to secure a route to the sea has stalled in Mostar.

Note: The latter two items make the possibility of the Clinton-NATO conditions for deployment almost nil.

14 Sept 93

Serb artillery bombarded the Croatian town of Karlovac, near **Zagreb**.

Lessons of Bosnia

Manfred Woerner, NATO's Secretary General, said the lessons of the West's failure in Yugoslavia are:

1. Strategic objectives must be set early and must be clear.
2. Limited objectives require limited options.
3. Don't let soldiers become hostages.
4. Alliances, as well as individual nations, must have the will to backup threats and diplomacy with firm action, military force if necessary. (Woerner considered this point important enough that he made it four times in his speech).
5. If that will doesn't exist, allow the victim to help itself.

These lessons amount to a **ringing indictment** of the way the U.N. does business. The credibility of U.N. negotiating efforts in Bosnia are consistently undercut by the incredibility of the U.N.'s threat to use force.

16 Sept 93

Bosnia and the Serbs signed an agreement that accepted the dissolution of Bosnia and recognized the possibility of secession for the Serb and Croat parts of Bosnia. Izetbegovic, however, said that secession could only take place after outstanding territorial claims are settled. (In other words, it's business as usual).

17 Sept 93

Croatian troops burned three captured Serb villages in Krajina before turning the villages over to UNPROFOR.

18 Sept 93

The Croat military is threatening **retaliation** (perhaps in Mostar?) for the alleged Muslim massacre of Croat civilians in central Bosnia.

† * C

The mutiny in Banja Luka ended.

20 Sept 93

Muslim access to the sea (probably via Neum, in Croatia) still prevents the signing of the Bosnian peace plan.

21 Sept 93

Beseiged Muslim forces in **Mostar** launched a three-pronged attack on the encircling Croats.

23 Sept 93

The House Appropriations Committee approved major **restrictions** on U.S. participation in international peacekeeping missions. The restrictions are incorporated in a \$240 billion Pentagon budget and are specifically attached to a new \$383 million reserve fund sought by Clinton for such operations. The President would be required to:

1. Give Congress 15 days notice before deploying troops.
2. Specify the mission.
3. Specify financing of the mission.
4. Get committee approval before drawing on the peace-keeping account.
5. Finally, the executive branch would be barred from using other military funds to finance peacekeeping operations.

Gen. **Shalikashvili**, Clinton's nominee for chairman of the JCS, **urged sending U.S. troops to Bosnia** if a peace plan is signed. He stressed that the collapse of such an agreement would "do irreparable damage" to NATO and that it would cause deep human suffering in the Balkans.

U.S. Plans Bosnia Deployment

Convinced that a peace agreement will be reached in Bosnia next week, Clinton is preparing to send **25,000 U.S. troops** into the region by the end of October. He was warned, though, by the chairman of the House defense appropriations subcommittee that he must seek

authorization for both the deployment and its funding.

The Pentagon believes a peace agreement is likely to produce a situation that is **not militarily threatening**. That's because it has the virtue of its defects, they believe. The Serbs, who have the upper hand militarily, win so much under the plan that they wouldn't be tempted to restart fighting to win more. And, if the agreement is viable, the U.S. commitment wouldn't have to be long and extensive. If it isn't, the U.S. will curtail its deployment and avoid becoming **deeply involved**.

Note: This all involves alot of wishful thinking. They are assuming that everything will go as planned. What if it doesn't? Then the U.S. deployment would be long and extensive - and bloody. The question that needs to be answered is not if the mission can be done - it can - but "Is it worth the price?"

A full cease-fire would begin seven days after the signing of the treaty. At the same time, the U.S. would quietly deploy of a small **advance party** of commo specialists. As that happened, NATO would look for several key actions on the ground, such as separation of hostile forces (*which have shown no previous inclination to do so on their own*), withdrawal of heavy weaponry and the free movement of humanitarian supplies. Four weeks after the cease-fire, demobilization would begin. Only when the cease-fire is deemed "viable" would the U.S. **fully commit troops**.

At that point, the U.S. plans to conduct a deployment in Sarajevo of several thousand troops, probably from the 1st Armored Division. That "**show stopper**"

would be followed by the logistical buildup of about three weeks culminating in the planned peak number of 25,000.

The centerpiece of the planned deployment would be the high-profile "show of force" placement of troops in the Bosnian capitol of **Sarajevo**. Other troops would be deployed in the mountains area to the south and southwest of Sarajevo, toward the Adriatic Sea, and along the **Serbian border**.

25 Sept 93

As the war nears its end, the divisions which it has hidden are surfacing. Within each of Bosnia's component peoples, **intramural enmities** are deepening.

Among the Muslims, four competing factions are emerging: The first demands that rump Bosnia must not let itself become a purely Muslim state, even though it will be overwhelmingly populated by Muslims. The second group argues that, if Muslims cannot live freely in Serb or Croat territory, the Muslim state ought to be equally exclusive. A third, weaker faction calls for the creation of an **Islamic state**. The final group wants to distribute the remains of Muslim Bosnia among warlords. The commander of Muslim Mostar is among those in the final group.

The division among the Croats is almost as bitter. It is the Croats in Bosnia proper who are paying the price for the dreams of **Greater Croatia**, because it is into their territory that the Muslims have counter-attacked. The Bosnian Croats feel abandoned and betrayed by Croatia. Though politically weak, they are beginning to organize themselves.

And that is just Bosnia.

Croatia, quite apart from the chunk occupied by the Serbs, is in danger of **unraveling**, as various parts demand autonomy from Zagreb. Then there is Serbia whose grip on Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro is tenuous at best ...

27 Sept 93

Croatian mines wounded four U.N. peacekeepers this weekend. Canadian and French units who came to aid the wounded U.N. soldiers were then fired on by the Croats.

† * C

In the Senate, senators Nunn and Dole have set conditions similar to those of the House for U.S. deployment. Nunn, in fact, called for an **exit strategy** before troops are committed.

28 Sept 93

Izetbegovic said that Bosnia must either sign an "unjust" peace accord or be starved into defeat by another winter of fighting with the Serbs and Croats.

29 Sept 93

A predominantly Muslim convention of politicians, intellectuals and religious leaders accepted a plan to divide Bosnia, but only on the condition Serbs return land seized by force. (*In other words, "We'll concede that you won, but only if you give us what you won."*)

30 Sept 93

Bosnia's parliament also rejected the peace plan (again), and for the same reason as yesterday's convention. Clinton reacted, "The price of passing up this peace may be very high."

Quote

"We need to be extremely careful about calling on young men to lay down their lives for something that ... does not affect our own

economic or security interests." (Sen. Sam Nunn)

Sources

Wall Street Journal, The Economist, USA Today, FBIS Daily Reports