

# YUGO NEWS



## Cosic Update

Cosic was suspected by Seselj and the Serb Radical Party (SRP) of plotting with the army, of which Cosic was the nominal head, to stage a coup. After Cosic's ouster, Vuk Draskovic, head of the largest democratic opposition party, was arrested. The opposition now seems to weak to stage further protests in the FRY.

Seselj has often been used by Milosevic to advance Milosevic's own ends. This may be happening again.

Backed by his own paramilitary group, Seselj is a strong advocate of ethnic cleansing. The SRP, of which Seselj is head, controls a third of the seats in parliament.

The U.S. and human rights organizations have accused both Selselj and Arkan (his soulmate in Kosovo) of war crimes.

The radicals role in the ouster of Cosic has caused dissent in Montenegro. Montenegro also wants peace in the region and believes sanctions have damaged its economy more than Serbia's. This could lead to its secession.

Montenegrin secession is not something the Serbs will take lying down: the FRY's only commercial port and naval base are located in

Montenegro and, should it secede, Serbia would landlocked.

## 8 June 93

Muslim forces seized Travnik from the Croats.

*Note: Which means they have at least some solo military ability, which raises the question of why they haven't been successful against the Serbs.*

## 10 June 93

Despite intel that the Macedonians <sup>are ambivalent about</sup> ~~don't want~~ U.S. military assistance, the U.S. announced it will send 300 peacekeepers to the country (one the U.S. doesn't diplomatically recognize). The troops will observe both the Kosovan and Serbian borders. UNPROFOR currently has 700 Scandinavian troops in Macedonia.

*Note: The U.S. appears to be treating Bosnia as a lost cause. Macedonia, Kosovo and Montenegro (if latter two states breakaway from the FRY) are still salvageable. It looks as if they will be our proverbial 'line in the sand.'*

## Bosnia's Options

The current options are bleak:

**One is to fight.** Bosnia could, in theory, draw on 250,000 men. However, Bosnia's only military successes have been against the Croatian's - not the Serbs who control 70% of the coun-

try. Fed up with military failure, the government on 6/8 replaced its commander-in-chief, Gen. Halilovic, with Gen. Delic. Yet counter-attacking the Serbs may need to await the more pressing task of preventing a total breakdown of Muslim military discipline. Gen. Delic's first job will be to impose a coherent system of ranks and to persuade local commanders to take orders. A new interior minister will attempt the same with Bosnia's policemen.

That leaves a **bad second choice**: negotiating with the Serbs, under U.N. auspices. Sarajevo could be demilitarized by having the Muslims give up their weapons, and having the Serbs move their artillery out of range. UNPROFOR would be used to keep the roads open. The Bosnian fear (justified in light of the events in Srebrenica since its surrender) is that the Serbs will use the guns elsewhere or renege, once the Muslims have disarmed.

## 13 June 93

The UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia, Gen. Morillon, said that Bosnia was so close to **"total anarchy"** that the U.N. might have to withdraw.



Gen. Wahlgren, the over-all UNPROFOR commander in Yugoslavia, met with Gen. Mladic, his Bosnian Serb counterpart to work out a

ceasefire.

Note: Without force there is no reason for the Serbs to adhere to a ceasefire. They have the upper hand, so they have nothing to gain from a ceasefire except, perhaps, to consolidate their gains.

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### 15 June 93

A confused U.N. said Bosnia needed 7,500 more peacekeepers, while its Secretary General said the number was more like 34,000.

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### 16 June 93

**Serbia is cracking down** against those who oppose the Bosnian war and the nationalist government of Milošević.

To the outside world, Milošević is showing a new moderate face, but at home he is shutting down dissent like the communists of old.

On the surface, Serbia seems ripe for a popular uprising, but fear and apathy prevail. Opposition leaders admit there is little they can do to motivate the population, conceding that Milošević has turned the U.N.'s sanctions to his nationalist advantage. Every night, state-controlled Belgrade TV spreads the message that the whole world is out to defeat the Serbs. And, for the most part, Serbs believe it.

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### 18 June 93

The future of 12,000 UNPROFOR troops in Croatia is also in doubt: Echoing the sentiments of Croatia's leader, the leader of Serb Krajina said that "total war" with Croatia could break out at any moment. He called for a referendum on merging with the Bosnian

Serbs, and also mobilized more troops. As a result, the U.N. said its troops were "in peril" from continued Serb-Croat fighting. Unless renewed, the U.N. mandate for Croatia runs out on 6/30/93. *Croatia extended the mandate to 7/31*

† † C  
The Vance-Owen peace plan is dead.

International mediators urged Bosnia's Muslim-lead government to acknowledge its underdog position and accept Serb-Croat proposals to divide Bosnia into three ethnic zones.

This stunning turnabout signals an end to the Vance-Owen plan to divide Bosnia into ten ethnic areas. Serbs had refused to sign that plan because it would have failed to give them a way of linking the territory they had won.

E.C. mediator Owen, reluctant to drop his plan, said it wouldn't bring "a lot of honor ... But I am a realist, and we have to live with what has happened on the ground."

Muslims, who had rejected the Serb-Croat plan, then indicated they would be willing to discuss it.

Clinton said the U.S. wouldn't stand in the way of the new proposals.

Partition of Bosnia would be hard for the world to square with the principles laid down at the London conference on Yugoslavia last August: that borders should not be changed by force and that land won by force could not be held.

If a partition is to work, the bitter enemies would have to agree to a map and borders. And even then, Serb and Croat forces would probably move to link up with their ethnic brethren, creating a Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia, with a tiny rump state of Bosnia sandwiched in between.

Currently, the Muslims control only 10% of Bosnia, in two widely separated regions. Such a tiny and divided state would almost inevitably be dominated, if not swallowed up, by its far larger neighbors.

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### 21 June 93

The C.O. of Muslim forces in Tuzla threatened to use **chlorine gas** against the Serbs. *(There have also been reports of chem attacks near Gorazde)*

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### 25 June 93

More than 3 million refugees in Yugoslavia are being kept alive almost entirely by food from the U.N. Further, only a quarter of what is needed is in the pipeline for July and nothing at all for August. Come peace or partition, the dispossessed will starve unless aid is forthcoming.

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### 29 June 93

The Serbs and Croats further agreed to troop withdrawals if their map was approved by the Bosnians.

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### 30 June 93

The U.N. failed to pass a U.S.-backed resolution to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia.

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### 1 July 93

The **U.N. reduced rations** in Bosnia due to insufficient supplies.

*6/21/93 - Srebrenica's water works was destroyed.*

## U.N. Charter Allows Arming the Bosnians

The E.C. and U.N. have for 21 months kept arms from the victims, not the perpetrators, of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. Ostensibly to avoid a military quagmire and to stop the killing, the West has been disarming the victims further (*remember the aftermath of Srebrenica?*) and herding them into "safe" havens. Such "havens" need military protection, food, sanitation and medical aid in perpetuity.

If the U.S. doesn't want to protect a remnant of Bosnia forever, it is right and in our interest to allow it to defend itself - to reverse our practice of keeping Bosnia more weakly armed than its attackers.

Clinton says he wants to lift the arms embargo but can't because the U.S. agreed to in U.N. Resolution 713. But U.N. 713 is a thin pretext for inaction. Milosevic wanted U.N. 713 because a continuing monopoly of heavy guns & armor made it easier for the FR Yugoslavia army to complete his program of ethnic cleansing. U.N. 713 refers to "Yugoslavia," which welcomed it, not Bosnia, Croatia or any of the republics that have since been accepted as members of the U.N. Yet, under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter (the same one Clinton cited when he justified the recent bombing of Iraq), all members of the U.N. have the right to seek & receive arms for individual or collective self-defense. *(Bosnia + Croatia have been receiving arms from Slovenia)*

Thus, the U.S. doesn't need a consensus of all other countries to unilaterally end the arms embargo.

We can break it alone. No one is obliged to continue an embargo that prevents a member of the U.N. from defending itself.

In fact, we have the contrary obligation under Article 1 of the Charter, not to aid Serbian genocide in Bosnia, but to stop it. It is those who continue to impose the embargo that maintain the Serbian monopoly of heavy arms who blatantly violate the Charter.

Britain and France say arming the Bosnians would endanger humanitarian aid to them. (They should think about how the U.S. "prolonged" World War II all the way to 1945 by giving Britain Lend Lease and destroyers in 1941.) If this gives humanitarianism a bad name, neither does it help the reputation for realism of Western negotiators who think of themselves as "pragmatists."

### 2 July 93

Bosnian Serbs and Croats began **demanding tolls** from U.N. relief convoys.

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Jailed Serb opposition leader Draskovic began a hunger strike.

### 6 July 93

The first 20 of 260 U.S. soldiers began arriving in Macedonia as part of the U.N. contingent in Macedonia.

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On top of dwindling U.N. relief, Sarajevo's fuel shortage has also resulted in a **shortage of bread**.

### 7 July 93

Serb & Croat military commanders snubbed peace

talks being held by the UNPROFOR commander.

### 8 July 93

The Bosnian government is leaning towards rejecting the Serb-Croat peace plan. *(Izetbegovic is one of the few remaining hold outs)*

### Quote

The Muslims have been highly critical of the UN force that the U.S. will join. Instead of calling it UNPROFOR, they disparagingly call it "SERBPROFOR."

### Sources

Wall Street Journal, Milwaukee Journal, The Economist, FBIS Daily Reports



# A BALKAN CHRONOLOGY

## 1986

**SEPTEMBER:** Serbian Academy of Sciences describes the Serbs as victims in Tito's Yugoslav Federation. It claims that Serbia's statehood is weakened by Kosovo and Vojvodina, two non-Serb autonomous regions within Serbia; that Albanians threaten the genocide of Serbs in Kosovo; that the rich republics of Slovenia and Croatia conspire to keep Serbia poor; and that Tito unjustly left many Serbs outside Serbia. All this implies a Serb claim to many Serbian enclaves far from Serbia that have never been part of Serbia.

## 1987

Milosevic seizes power in the Serbian Communist Party, exploiting the paranoid nationalism illustrated by the academy's statement.

## 1989

**MARCH:** Milosevic ends the constitutional autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina.

**JUNE:** Milosevic's plans for taking over Croatia begin. He stirs up street mobs and armed uprisings in Knin, capital of Krajina, a region of Croatia.

## 1990

**MARCH and APRIL:** Slovenia and Croatia hold first multiparty elections in nearly 50 years. Non-Communist democratic coalitions win. Six months later similar coalitions win in Macedonia and Bosnia.

**JULY:** Milosevic uses "federal" army to establish a Serb administration in Krajina.

**OCTOBER:** EC summit declares support for a unified Yugoslavia.

**DEC. 9 and 23:** In Serbia and Montenegro,

communists renaming themselves socialists and using ultra-nationalist appeals over controlled mass media win in multiparty elections.

**DEC. 23:** In Slovenia, 90% of eligible voters hold plebiscite authorizing Slovenian Parliament to declare independence in six months if negotiations have not yielded a new Yugoslavian confederation that would allow autonomy for a democratic Slovenia.

## 1991

**FEBRUARY:** Milosevic instigates uprisings in Slavonia, a region of Croatia.

**APRIL:** Milosevic declares the Croatian territory of Krajina an autonomous region of Serbia.

**MAY 30:** Croatia announces its intention to secede if a confederation accord is not reached by June 15, 11 days before the Slovenian deadline.

**JUNE 21:** Baker goes to Belgrade, declaring support for a unified Yugoslavia. Says U.S. will not recognize Slovenia or Croatia.

**JUNE 25:** Croatia and Slovenia declare independence.

**JUNE 27:** Croatia and Slovenia, at EC request, agree to suspend implementation of their independence for six months. On the same day, Milosevic's "federal" army invades Slovenia, which had prepared to defend itself, forcing Serbian withdrawal in less than two weeks.

**MID-JULY:** Milosevic's "federal" army invades Croatia.

**SUMMER:** First EC conference on peace in Yugoslavia.

**SEPTEMBER:** U.N. imposes arms embargo on Yugoslavia at request of its Serb-dominated government.

**SEPTEMBER:** Milosevic begins to target Bosnia. Declares several Serb autonomous regions in Bosnia.

**SEPTEMBER:** Serbs shell Croatian cities of Vukovar and Osijek.

**OCT. 7:** Serbs attack Zagreb, capital of Croatia.

**OCT. 8:** Croatia and Slovenia resume movement toward independence.

**DECEMBER:** Serbs shell Croatian city of Dubrovnik. Croatian city of Vukovar surrenders.

**DEC. 23:** Germany recognizes Slovenia and Croatia, six months after the Serbs invaded Slovenia.

## 1992

**JANUARY:** EC recognizes Slovenia and Croatia.

**\*APRIL 4 or 7:** Milosevic's surrogate Radovan Karadzic declares the Serb republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

**\*APRIL 5 or 6:** The EC and Germany recognize Bosnia on the basis of an internationally monitored plebiscite held Feb. 29.

**\*APRIL 6-7:** Serbs bombard Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia, and Serbian paramilitary forces aided by Milosevic's "federal" army invade. (Some sources say the bombing of Sarajevo started much earlier.)

**APRIL 7:** U.S. recognizes the multiethnic Republic of Bosnia.

*\*While sources differ on the precise dates, it is clear that these events all happened at about the same time and in expectation of each other and so the exact order doesn't matter.*

—Albert Wohlstetter